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At 520 pages, with a title of Cognition and Chance: The Psychology of Probabilistic 
Reasoning, I hoped this book would deepen my understanding of how human beings reason 
probabilistically.  My interest stems from teaching and practicing statistics where I have 
learned to be wary of quantitative intuition.  I think this is a common feeling among 
statisticians who, as a group, often directly experience the inherent limitations and biases of 
how human beings observe, process, and interpret quantitative information.  We know, for 
example, that human beings: tend to find patterns in data where none exist; are wonderfully 
adept at post hoc rationalization of results and outcomes; quickly leap from correlation to 
causation; are subject to many subtle biases; etcetera.   
 
So, an authoritative treatment of the psychology of probabilistic reasoning would be quite 
useful and could help us understand when to trust and when to question human intuition.  
For example, what types of quantitative reasoning is the human brain naturally better or 
worse at?  When are we good intuitive probabilists and when are we bad?  Do we know 
why?  Thus, in reading this book I hoped to gain a better understanding of such issues, if for 
no other reason than to help me better know when to trust my own intuition.  Unfortunately, 
this book did not live up to my expectations.  As I will discuss more fully below, it 
disappointed in three specific ways.   
 
The first disappointment is that the amount of the text specifically devoted to probabilistic 
reasoning is relatively small compared to the book’s length.  At 520 pages and 12 chapters, I 
expected a fairly deep and thorough discussion of the book’s titled topic.  Yet only chapter 
11 (“People as Intuitive Probabilists”) is devoted to the particular subject of probabilistic 
reasoning.  Chapters 8 through 10 (“Estimation and Prediction,” “Perception of Covariation 
and Contingency,” and “Choice under Uncertainty”) are also related, discussing other 
aspects of quantitative reasoning, but fully two-thirds of the book is devoted to topics that 
are largely general background material.   
 
In particular, chapters 1 through 7 focus on topics such as: a general history of the field of 
probability as it developed from games of chance; the various meanings, interpretations, and 
misinterpretations of the concepts of randomness and coincidence; an entire chapter 
explaining Bayes’ Theorem; another chapter devoted to a discussion of various paradoxes 
(St. Petersburg, Simpson’s, etc.); and, a general exposition of the field of statistics.  These 
chapters seem to have been written for a lay-audience and are largely non-quantitative.  
Other than perhaps the first chapter, they are likely to be only of passing interest to someone 
with advanced statistical training. 
 
The second disappointment is the exposition tends to be more broad than deep.  A typical 
discussion in the later chapters is of the form “researcher A found this and researcher B 
found that, while researcher C found a contrary result” with the results only described in the 
briefest and most general terms.  Few, if any, specifics about the various research efforts are 
described and little effort seems to have been made to discuss the results in anything more 
than a superficial manner.  For example, in Chapter 8 the author wrote, “When asked to 
observe a set of numbers and to estimate some measure of central tendency, such as its 
mean, people are able under some conditions to produce reasonably accurate estimates 
(Beach & Swensson, 1966; Edwards, 1967; C.R. Peterson & Beach, 1967), although 
systematic deviations from actual values have also been reported (N.H. Anderson, 1964; I.P. 
Levin, 1974, 1975)” (p. 284).  Now, while I have chosen one of the more egregious 
examples of a singularly unhelpful “discussion,” the lack of detail is not atypical of the 
book’s general tone and approach.  As a result, the reader is often left without enough 
information to truly understand the strengths or limitations of the cited results or the 
author’s summary conclusion.   
 
In a related vein, while the author’s grasp of a very large body of material is quite 
impressive, the narration often feels more like a wandering discussion than a focused 
examination.  Futher, while each chapter does have a summary section, as does the book, 
each of these is superficial, simply regurgitating various general discussions from each 
chapter in an even more general fashion.  In fact, after 435 pages of text, the summary 
chapter for the entire book is less than two full pages long.   
 The third disappointment – related to the second – is the failure of the text to go beyond lists 
and discussions of individual studies and provide the reader with a broader context in which 
to place the information.  That is, upon completion of the book the reader is left with various 
categories of research study results generally summarized, but little to no information about 
what this means for the broader question of how humans reason quantitatively and whether 
or not there are theories or models that help explain, summarize, or synthesize the various 
study results into some larger framework of human probabilistic reasoning.   
 
For example, there are no charts or graphics or tabularizations anywhere in the book that 
provide the reader with an overview or taxonomy of the field of research.  Similarly, there is 
no outline or description of how psychologists think about or summarize the observed 
phenomenon nor any real discussion about various theories that may exist to explain human 
quantitative or probabilistic reasoning.  Nothing in the book provides a reader with any sort 
of “big picture” within which to understand how the various lengthy expositions fit.   
 
Criticism aside, in reading Cognition and Chance: The Psychology of Probabilistic 
Reasoning, I did expand my knowledge about probabilistic reasoning.  My disappointment 
may be the result of unrealistic expectations on my part or perhaps insufficient editorial 
assistance by the publisher.  On the positive side, the book does bring together many diverse 
sources and results on a host of topics.  As such, it could serve as a useful starting point for 
the new researcher beginning a study of some aspect of quantitative reasoning. 
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